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YATES VS TAYLOR, THE COURT SAID "TAYLOR BREACHED THE AGREEMENT". 
ITS TRUE TAYLOR RETURNED THE EXCAVATOR TO YATES, WHERE YATES 
RE SOLD THE MACHINE, FOR MORE MONEY THAN HE HAD SOLD THE EXCAVAT-
OR TO TAYLOR FOR. THE COURT SAW TO IT TAYLOR RECEIVED THE OVERAGE 
AMOUNT, BUT CHARGED TAYLOR CWRONGFULLY3 FOR YATES'ES IMPOROPERLY 
CLAIMED REPAIRS, WHICH YATES CLAIMED WERE AS A RESULT OF DAMAGES 
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COSTS OF REPAIRS, NOT YATES. YATES MISREPRESENTED TO TAYLOR THE 
CONDITION OF THE EXCAVATOR. TAYLOR DID NOT RENEGOCIATE THE SALE, 
BUT MERELY "CORRECTED YATES MISTAKE'S". AND RETURNED THE EXCAVAT-
OR. 
FACT ONE 
The court [did not] take into consideration the sub zero weather 
in Lehi, and that the six hours spent by Taylor [was not3 spent 
in looking the excavator over but starting a cold deisel engine. 
page £ 
Fact two 
The purchase agreement left by Yates ar\d signed by Taylor 
on January 8, 1390, was for the sum of C Two Thousand two hundred 
dollars] . (see exhibit 37 C enclosed) Taylor could have left 
Yates a check on January 8, 1990 for, C$ £,£00.003 ar\d owned the 
cavator i n question. 
Fact three 
Taylor called Yates attention to Yates mistake while 
Taylor was at Century Equipment Company- Yates Crushed] to 
meet Taylor at Century Equipment for the sole purpose of 
[correctingD, not re-negeoting, the agreement, as the court 
concluded was the reason Yates meeting Taylor at Century, 
(see Trial record page 6 line's 11 thru £5) 
Fact four 
Repetedly, Yates admitted while under oath, Yates 
had told Taylor, prior to the sale, prior to Taylor removing 
the excavator from Yates equipment yard,that the excavator 
was [ In Good Condition 3 « ( see Trial Record pages, 1£0 
line's ££,£3,£4; Paxge 1£1 line's £,3,4,; Page 189 line's 
10,11,12;) 
Argument 
In the case of the four facts presented Yates implied a warranty, 
that the excavator was in [good condition] Taylor wanted art 
excavator to excavate, not to look at. Taylor beleived Yates, 
a respected equipment dealer. Had Taylor left a check for 
2-
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the $ 2,200-00 on January 8, 1990 pursuant to the agreement 
reduced to writing by Yates, as that sales agreement does 
state, Taylor could have taken advantage of Yates. Taylor 
however Cdid not entertain that ideal at all, but Taylor 
called Yates attention to Yates mistake. Yates intentionally 
told Taylor that the excavator was in Cvery good condition] or 
Cgood condition] This proved to be a total misrepresentation 
of fact. Taylor relied in Yates Judgement. Yates and Taylor 
had done business before. Yates is an expert, and has been 
recommending, and selling, used construction equipment for 
years, (see Trial Record page S3, line's 20 thru 25) The 
law simply does not condone misrepresentation and states in 
ftmJur 17ft 2d, 299, [Stipulations excluding extraneous represent-
ations constituting or showing fraud], (see page 27, of Taylors 
brief, and note three additional law references are given, 
Un i form Commerc i a 1 Code 70ft~2-~602 (1) , Urc i form Consumers Sa 1 es 
practice act, and Uniform Deceptive Sales Practices Plct. ftll 
conclude that the acts are to protect the consumer from 
suppliers who engage in deceptive sales practices, who represent 
that goods or services are of a particular quality and grade. 
Yes, its true Yates admits he told Taylor that excavator Cwas 
in good condition] The court should not reward Yates for 
such mistatement of fact. Yates admitted where he got the 
machine, and that he painted the machine . ( t o make the 
machine look better) 
page 3 
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Fact Five 
The trial Court allowed for offsets, and damages Yates Claimed 
Taylor Cdid to the excavator1 while the excavator was in Taylors 
possession. The exclusionary Rule was imposed. No wittness heard 
the other's testimony, yet Make Young Testified that the 
excavator cab was not bolted down upon the excavators arrival 
on the job site January S, 1990. ( see Traal Record page 151, 
line's £1,IE:3) . Further that the machine had oil leaks, arid that 
two barrel Is pf oil were put in it CilO gallons] which is totally 
excessive for 5 or G hours operation. < see Trial Record page 
151, Line £5). That oil consumption amounts to 18 galloms per 
hour, at a price of $ 7.00 per gallon, or $ iclS. 00 per hour for 
oil consumption alone, absolutely unreasonable oil consumption. 
Additional questions regarding the condition of the excavator 
when it arrived on the job site on January 8, 1990, 
were presented to Mike Young on Page 153 of the trial record 
who responded, that the excavator's electricial system was 
not working well, (line £5 page 151) That the batteries were 
not new, That the Alternator, a major part of the electricial 
system, did not work at all, (See page 154 trial record). Yates 
claimed Taylor caused the cab to be loose, caused the electricial 
system to not work, caused oil leaks, etc., which simply was not 
the truth. All of these malfunctions [were present3 at the time 
of sale to Taylor. 
Fact six 
Page 4 
The court C did not hear Garry Garrett ]. Gary Garrett was the 
Non Disputed owner of the Excavator at the time of sale to 
Taylor by Yates since he had not received any payment from 
either Yates or Utah Track & Welding on January S, 1990. In 
Barretts testimony, Barratt said while under oath, and Garrett 
Cdid not! hear the testimony of Mike Young. ( Neither Young 
or Garrett heard the others testimony.). Garrett said, that 
when he last saw the excavator, that the Cab [was not] bolted 
down, that the excavator Cdid not3 have a functional electrial 
system, that the drivers door C was welded 1 shut, that the 
rnetal was dented in bad condition. ( See Trial Record Pa\ge 133) 
Further Garratt under oath stated he had seen the excavator 
just prior to its sale to Taylor, av\d that and that very little 
alterations or repairs had been made to the machine, (see Trial 
record page 146, line's 17 to £'£' ). 
Fact Seven 
Yates, in his deposition, while under oath to tell the truth 
responded to Taylors question, -{first you have got to make it 
run> Yates -reply, was [Well if you can't make it run you 
couldnt check it out] neither Taylor, or any of his help could 
make the excavator run. 
Fact eight 
While Yates claimed he sent Taylor the Name of the person who 
purchased the Taylor machine, it was the day following the trial 
that Taylor [discovered] that Yates Cdid not perform] ar\y of the 
Page 5 
repairs Yates sa\id were necessary after the machine was 
returned to Yates by Taylor. It is a gross injustice to 
reward Yates for repairs or work I he did not do II. The machine 
had all the defects Yates claimed CPrior to the Sale] to Taylor 
and II after II the Sale to Acker man. 
Fact Nine 
Yates, while under oath told the court that C well tell's the 
people {customers} what Ewe] know is wrong with the machine. 
Trial record page 1£:£, line's i,£',3 ). Yates told Taylor that 
the excavator he bought was in good condition, but yet he knew 
what was wrong with that excavator, and knew what to claim 
Taylor damaged on it. Yates was deceptive, and unfair with 
Taylor, yet Yates told the court on page 176 of the trial 
record, line's 3, 4, 5, that definitely not, no I wouldnt, 
sell you -{Taylor > something not worth the money, and Yates 
goes on to repeat, ,! NO IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN" which leaves 
Taylor to beleive That Yates knew that the machine was not 
worth the money which he had sold to Taylor. 
Fact ten 
Taylor perserved his right to a Jury trial. In fact paid the 
proper Jury trial fee, and was timely in such filing. The 
court has not addressed this issue. Taylor has repetedly 
objected both through counsel, and pro ~se concerning this fact, 
(see page 3, Taylors Brief, bottom senentace. 
CONCLUSION 
Page 6 
The references concerning this matter in the trial court is 
found on pages IDE: and 103 of the trial court record the whole 
pages refer to the "short circuit " process. What is seems 
unreasonable to Taylor is that the court allowed Yates to 
amrnend his complaint while in open court, taking Taylor totally 
by surprise and setting aside the Utah R. Civ- P., dealing 
with amrnending a complaint, passing the blame to Mr. Johnson 
is no reason, for suspension of the Rules. The trial court 
judge made it clear that Taylor, " if you are going to represent 
yourself, You've got to comply with the Rules of practice11, 
(trial Record page 4 ). Taylor was not supplied a copy of 
the findings of fact as the Utah ftpp. Ct. States. It was 
only after Taylor made a hand written request to the clerk of 
the trial court on July £S, 1991? see exhibit 3S, of Taylors 
brief, that Taylor received from the court clerk a copy of 
*l"!®-J7*ndings of fact and conclusions of Law to review 
after they were signed by the trial pourt^ Jj-l5*9e":_ P^S© two 
of the conclusions, do not refer to Yates, statement that 
he, I Jim YatesD told Taylor that the excavator was in 
good condition. If that had been fact Taylor would have k.E?pt 
the excavator, as Taylor had kept the other equipment he 
had purchased from Jim Yates. Taylor was a repeat purchaser, 
as Yates always told Taylor, If it doesnt work out for you 
bring it back. The conclusions did not correctly refer to the 
$ £,£00.00 sales agreement. 
The court may ask the question, Why did Taylor take the the 
excavator out of Yates Yard with all the things wrong, that 
Taylor complains about„ The Answer is simple. With the 
new shiney paint, with the representation of Yates that the 
machine was in good condition, with the representation made by 
Yates, that if the machine doesnt work for you bring it back, 
Sind I will refund your money. Of these there items, two are 
absolutely misrepresentations, to induce a sale. (1) Yates 
would not return any money. This law suit proves that point. 
<£) The excavator was not in good condition as claimed by 
Yates. Yates is claiming Taylor damaged the machine. This is 
absolutely false as testified by Young and Garrett, both had 
hands on knowledge, which they shared with the court. Discovery 
made after the trial, two seperate incidents, Where Yates did 
uses deceptive sales practices, one a man in Washington, the 
other case in Rock Springs Wyoming, point out that Taylor is 
not the only victum of Yates. If the court continues to Laffirrnll 
this Judgement, This will open the door for Yates to rip off 
consumer after consumer, with his simple disclaimer, and to back 
this up a court Ruling, in support of his (what you see is what 
is is) or <sold with out warranty expressed or implied). The 
court stated on its memorandum decision -Cdo not publish). Why? 
ft land mark decision, allowing that all prior law dealing with 
misrepresentation, with deceptive sales practices, should be 
important and shared with all equipment dealers, who all want to 
be advised in law what the court considers as right in such 
matters. Taylor, considers that if the court panel of judges 
individually, were each subject to the same conditions as was 
Taylor, in connection with this excavator transaction, that all 
would join Taylor, and take the excavator back. Taylor Spent 
over five thousand Dollars into this machine for very little 
return. If the excavator dug 500 feet as testified, that repair 
bill amounted to * 10.00 per foot in repairs only, not to 
mention, the operator, fuel, etc. This is unreasonable. Taylors 
Counterclaim, and ammended counterclaim, were considered moot 
by the courts. Taylor again apppeals to the court, to reconsider 
his counterclaims. Some where something is wrong, when Yates 
tells the court, "Yes I told Taylor this1 excavator is in good 
condition", and Taylor provided the actual Owner at the time 
of Sale, -CYates Sold an Excavator to Ta/lor owned by Barrett> 
no questions, asked, and further Garran; said the machine was 
aa peice of junk at trial, and yet the <4pp court Affirms, the 
Judgement of the lower court. Yates was not damaged. He RE 
sold the excavator to another party for more money, since he 
Cdid not do the repairs as claimed! The* testimoney of whetstone, 
clears up doubt, if in fact there is any doubt after the 
testimony of Young, and Garratt, and Ta/lor is reconsidered. 
Surely the court panel can see why Yates discounted the machine 
$ 1, 000.00. It wasnt to be fair to Taylor. The reason was to 
make Taylor feel good, so Taylor would beleive Yates story, 
and excute a corrected agreement, fimmei.ding the * £,£00.00 
agreement. Good salesmanship on the part of expert salesman 
One of the reasons Taylor requested a Jury Trial was because 
Taylor did not think Judges understand construction Equipment. 
When its cold it wont start. When the frost is driven down by 
traffic, foot, cars, equipment, etc, you simply Ccan not] 
dig. That is a fact which the court ' s did not take into 
consideration at all. No matter how badly Taylor wanted to, or 
how much looking unde^, over, or around the excavator, Taylor 
would neveir been able to "check out the Machine" at Yates 
Yard in Lehi. Its True while the machine was being heated and 
started Taylor called out certian repairs that needed made. 
Construction equipments sits idle in Utah County durning the 
month of January because its to cold to work when the ground 
is frozen. Thats Fact, ft Jury Would understand and agree to 
that fact, filso the Courts, uphold at -Ctimes> the written 
instrument. Other Times they totally uphold Parol evidense 
over t£e written instrument's. This is confusing, filso a Pro Se 
Party has a better chance with a jury, than before a court 
Judge, who looks for procedural mistakes, and there are many 
times when a Pro Se party is unable to express clearly his 
defenses or arguments. The fact is Taylor was denied his right 
to a trial by Jury. The flpp Ct has not address this issue. 
Taylor, again Prays, the the ftpp Ct. will consider all the 
evidense regarding thfis case, overturn the lower court judgement, 
and remand this matter back to the district court so Taylor 
can pursue his count *rclaim.^ 
Dated This (\ J ^P*y of January 1993. 
Taviorvy Pro Se 
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A Um-hum. (yes) (handing) 
Q Okay. We are talking aborj Mr. Vaughn Adams. And 
we go through and we discuss what he does. "He has no re-
sponsibility other than the fact that he is just a mechanic?" 
That was the question that I asked you. 
A Um-hum. (yes) 
Q Your reply: "He has a lot of responsibility, yes, 
but mainly he is a mechanic." 
A Um-hum. (yes) 
Q He is a mechanic there anc' :.hat is what he is 
there for or he is there? 
A Um-hum. 
Q Question: "Is he an assistant manager?" Answer: 
"No." Question: "You mentioned his responsibilities. Could] 
you elaborate on those besides being 2 mechanic and so on?" 
And your answer was: "He is a husband and a homemaker." Hadj 
no relevance to the question. I'm wondering if perhaps you 
were confused when you made that answ.r? 
A No. He does that too, yes. 
Q Isn't it true that you told me the machine was in 
excellent condition? 
A I toj-d you I thought it was in good condition, coma 
down and check it out and if you like it, buy it, if not, 
leave it. 
Okay. You did tell me that if it was in good 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
I8 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
condition then or you admit telling ro.2 that? 
J A I admit I stated it was in good condition, you 
| come down and check it out, if you like it, take it, if not, | 
leave it. 
Q Do you consider, let's loo* at Exhibit 1, do you 
consider terms like "check the machine out, what you see is 
what it is" — 
A Yes. 
Q Is reasonable? 
A You bet. That's kind --
Q Without being unconscionable? Hs\ft\^ 
MR. ANDERSON: 01 ejection, your Honor. 
"unconscionable11 is a legal term, cal Is for a legal conclu-
sion. 
THE COURT: If ht- knows, he may answer. 
MR. ANDERSON: Okay. 
A That is laying it on the line as blunt as you can 
lay it on the line. I mean, that's »he reason I haven't been 
to court at other times. I mean, I j.ay it so bluntly that 
there is no misunderstanding. 
Q (By Mr. Taylor) J)o you fe<l that you have an | 
obligation to inform a prospective buyer if a machine is 
junk or not? 
MR. ANDERSON: 0-jection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: He roay answer, if he knows. 
1 91 
1 why I'm inviting the customers in, and they come in time and 
2 time again and buy. I donft know whrit happened to you this 
3 time to stop payment on your check, but that's the way I 
4 represented everything. And that's :he only way I can sell 
5 them. 
6 Q In other words, you wouldn t see that you wouldn't 
7 sell very much equipment if you said "what you see is what 
8 you get" on the advertisements, insteid of being in "good 
9 condition"? 
10 j\ It is in good condition. It was in very good con-
11 dition. And you did buy it. What yo. done to it afterwards, 
12 I don't know. 
13 Q Do you agree that those sta jients, "what you see 
14 is what you get, as is, with no warranties," where is and 
15 so forth, may possibly be unconscionable statements? Is that 
16 kind of unconscionable, to take advantage of the --
17 A No, it does not. 
18 Q By having initially taken ad\ ntage of the customer 
19 by having initially expressed in effect --
20 THE COURT: Now just a moment. Don't 
21 argue with one another. Don't answer tl *» question. I don't 
22 want you to be argumentative within you~ question, Mr. 
23 Taylor. 
24 Q (By Mr. Taylor) I said, isn't it kind of an uncon-
25 scionable statement to have that type of phra oology before 
Ill l Observation: Under the Restatement, a term unreasonably exempting 
a party from the legal consequences of a misrepresentation is unenforcea-
ble on grounds of public policy.*4 
§ 299. —Stipulations excluding extranet 
showing fraud 
One of the parties to a transaction 01 * 
may attempt to exclude from consider, 
controversy or litigation, any statements, 
may have been made during the negotu 
which may not be included in the writing . 
generally been unsuccessful where such 
found to have been made fraudulently or i 
79. Restatement, Contracts 2d § 195. """ "—* --** 
80. Industrial & General Trust v Tod 
215, 75 NE 7; Christian Mills. Inc 
MM repreicnt»* f^fTif CftlT*1**1*^ o r 
jiciiitut memorialized by a writing 
• ion in the event of subsequent 
— • ...i«:«u remarks, or representations which 
tions, or any such representations 
tself. Such efforts at exclusion have 
statements or representations are 
i be of such nature that a charge of 
§299 
CONTRACTS 
17AAmJur2d 
any representation not contained t! 
ntiS ~ - 0 i i tVie tm-TT^ fi, a n d ^ 
-act." that neither party o»u 
jcm.™ that the writing contains the entire 
u'» thrre is no warranty nnf spmfirally set 
even though a written agreemem ww..
 m pts to eummaiv 
any extraneous statements or actions.* Fraud wil| vitiate any rnntraq pfocured; 
thereby, and it is in application of thirrule that stipulations seeking to avoid 
the result of fraud in procuring contracts are held to be inoperative and 
ineffectual in this regard.14 
In some jurisdictions effect is ,wcu In stipulations in written agreements 
which attempt to nullify the effee of any representations which may have been 
made extraneous to the written memorial. The courts following this view 
emphasize the desirability of cert < v\ty in the contractual relations of those who 
have made a definite agreemen ; and if the parties say that they contract 
without regard to prior repress tations, and that prior utterances have not 
been an inducement to their co \ *nt, any occasional damage to the individual 
88. Nelson v Leo's Auto Sales, Inc., i!>8 ML 
368, 185 A2d 121; Nash Mississippi Valley 
Viator Co. v Childress, 156 Miss 157, 125 So 
.708; Land Finance Corp. v Sherwin Electric 
'Co., 102 Vt 75, 146 A 72. 75 ALR 1025. 
89. Arnold v National Aniline ic Chemical (AI 
ICA2 NY) 20 F2d 564, 56 ALR 4 
90. Jordan v Nelson (Iowa) 178 NW 644, L0 
ALR 1464; Ganley Bros, v Buder Bros. Bldg. 
Co., 170 Minn 373, 212 NW 60^ 56 ALR 1, 
Meyer v Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 
Ohio St 528, 1 Ohio L Abs 80, 140 NE 118, 28 
ALR 986; Motor Contract Co. v Van Der Vol 
gen, 162 Wash 449, 298 P 705, 79 ALR 29 
Baylies v Vanden Boom, 40 Wyo 411, 27ft 1 
551,70 ALR 924. 
91. Bowersock v Barker. 186 Okla 48. 96 P2 
IS. »n»M • ^ ' ^ " S " * ^ " ' ' - ^ 
ISO. . 
M . Arnold v National Iff"**^ ' J , (CA2 NY) 20 F2d 364. * A £ , * i 7 o t ] )6 NW 
well tc Co. v Jacobson.130i Iowal ^ ^ 
614; Canley Broj. vltatter »ro
 S e c u . 
170 Minn 373. « y M ^ i M S D *?. 219 nty Holding Co. v Chn«enseno ^ ^ 
(CA2 NY) M r «
 i t r a c t | h a f u M > 1 
!er, ribbon, token, 
idy, or any other 
which any appeal 
flower, flag, button, 
trinket, tag, souvei 
article in connection 
is made for any charitable purpose, or where 
the name of any charitable organization or 
movement is used or referred to as an in-
ducement or reason for making any purchase 
donation, or where, in connection with any 
sale or donation, any statement L made that 
the whole or any part of the proceeds of any 
sale or donation will go to or be donated to 
any charitable purpose. A charitable solicita-
tion is considered complete when made, 
whether or not the organization or person 
making the'solicitation receives any contri-
bution:"br makes any sale. 
(2)- "Consumer • transaction" means " a Bale, 
leaser assignment, award by chance, or other 
written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, 
services, or other property, both tangible and in-
tangible (except securities and insurance), to a 
person for primarily personal, family, or house-
hold purposes, or for purposes that relate to a 
business opportunity that requires both his ex-
penditure of money or property and his personal 
services on a continuing basis and in which he 
Has not been previously engaged, or a solicitation 
or offer by a supplier with respect to any of these 
transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or 
solicitation, any agreement, any performance of 
an agreement with respect to any of these trans-
fers or dispositions, and any charitable solicita-
tion as defined in this section. 
(3) "Enforcing authority" means the Division 
\J Consumer Protection. 
4) "Final judgment" means a judgment, in-
cluding any supporting opinion, that determines 
':he rights of the parties and concerning which 
8j\iellate remedies have been exhausted or the 
tine for appeal has expired. 
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, 
government, governmental . subdivision or 
agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, 
association, cooperative, or any other legal en, 
\t&y. -vi-"."^^ '^*;'..„.,•,- ,..•..-,: "'IV 
(6) ^Supplier* means a seller, lessor, assignor, 
.offeror, broker, or other person who regularly so-
licits, engages in, or enforces consumer transac-
tions, whether or not he deals directly with the 
consumer. :r ';V.';;i.Viv# - ;•'.• V ^^rj^.s^y.. MOT 
1J-ll-4. Deceptive act or practice by supplier. 
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in con-
nection with a consumer transaction violates this 
chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transition. 
" .(2) "Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a 
supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if UM» 
supplier, with intent to deceive.* 
v\\) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
Ja."sisaction has sponsorship, approval, perfor-
mance characteristics, accessories, uses, or bene-
fits if it has not; 
_ i^Lindic£j£ iUhat^ jgansaction is,of a particular standard, quality* 
grade^ style, or modeL if it is not: 
"TTS3 mmcates tEat ,tna .'subject of a consumer 
transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or has 
bean used to an extent that is materially differ-
ent from the fad; 
U O U B W U U U tci uvtumuie vo m e cousfli 
reason that does not exist; V I ^ U M 
(e) indicates that the subject OPfH 
transaction has been supplied in accord 
a previous representation, if it has M 
(f) indicates that the subject of a i 
transaction will be supplied in greater 
than the supplier intends; - $0$ 
(g) indicates that replacement br^ i 
needed, if it is not; :*1 
(h) indicates that a specific price i 
exists, if it does not; \'S^$j 
(i) indicates that the supplier has • 
ship, approval, or affiliation he, does 1 
(j) indicates that a consumer^transa 
volves or does not involve a warrant; 
claimer of warranties, particular 1 
terms, or other rights, remedies, or oblig 
the representation is false; .,.,;,/ :. | 
(k) indicates that the consumer will 1 
rebate, discount, or other benefit as an 
ment for entering into a consumer trans 
return for giving the supplier the name 
spective consumers or otherwise helping 
plier to enter into other consumer transa 
receipt of the benefit is contingent oft 4 
occurring after the consumer enters i 
transaction; 
G) after receipt of payment for 
vices, fails to ship the goods or furnish 
vices within the time advertised or oi 
represented or, if no specific time is adve 
represented, fails to ship the goods or fur 
services within 30 days, unless within tl 
cable time period the supplier provides tl 
with the option to either cancel the salt 
ment and receive a refund of all previ< 
ments to the supplier or to extend the i 
date to a specific date proposed by the I 
but any refund shall be mailed or deliver* 
buyer within ten business days after ti 
receives written notification from the 1 
the buyer's right to cancel the sales ag 
and receive the refund; ;&* 
(m) fails to furnish a notice of the puir 
right to cancel a direct solicitation sale 
three business days at the time of purcha 
sale is made other than at the supplier1 
lished place of business pursuant to the si 
mail, telephone, or personal contact an 
. sale price exceeds $25, which notice sh 
, conspicuous statement written in bold 
immediate proximity to the space resei 
the signature of the buyer, as follows: 
THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS 
TRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIE 
OF THE THIRD BUSINESS DAY AFT! 
DATE OF THE TRANSACTION."; <** 
(n) promotes, offers, or grants particip 
a pyramid scheme as defined under Cha; 
Title 76; or > • ^ 
(o) represents that the funds or propei 
veyed in response to a charitable solicitat 
be donated or used for a particular pur 
will be donated to or used by a particular 
zation, if the representation is false. 
13-11-5. Unconscionable act or practice'' 
• plier. • • \ , | | 
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a I 
in connection with a consumer transaction'^ 
5282. The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practice* At* , t 
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,- piomulgated in 1964 and 
revised in 1966, has been adopted in either the earlier or later version by a 
number of states,1 albeit with additions, variations, omissions, and the like. 
. The Act provides that a person engages in a der^iiv^ tr*A* pnrt;~ wK r 
in the course of his business, vocation, or < c^upation, hr- (1) pa«<^ off goods 
or services as those of another: (2) causes likelihood of confiisionorof 
93. l a i r Reviews: Sebert, Enforcement of 
State Deceptive Trade Practice Statutes 42 
Tenn L Rev 689 (1975). 
94.15USCS8l41ecieq. 
95. FTC v Speny tc Hutchinson Co., 405 US 
233, SI L Ed 2d 170, 92 S O 898, 1972 CCH 
Trade Cases 175861. 
96. Fonseca, 
Cases 3d 11:8. 
Handling Consumer Cicilit 
LMW Review*: Cilleran and Stadfcld, Link 
FTC Acts Emerge in Business Liugauon. 72 
ABA} 58 May 1.1986. 
Annotations: What constitutes "false advei 
Using" of food products or cosmetics within 
IS 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act (15 USCS If 45, 52), 50 ALR Fed 16. 
What constitutes "false advertising" of drugs 
or devicci within II 5 and 12 of tnc Federal 
Trade Commission II i 
49 ALR Fed 16 
|15 USCS | | 4 
97. Fonseca, Handling Consumer i r I  
Cases 3d 11:8. 
98. See, for example. Commonwealth _ 
Creamer v Monumental Properties, Inc., 45! 
Pa 450, S29 A2d 812, on remand 26 Pa 
Cmwlth S99, 565 A2d 442; Uneedus v Califor-
nia Shoppers, Inc. (4th Dist) 86 Cat App 3d 
932, 150 Cal Rptr 596, 1979-2 CCH Trade 
Cases 162845. 
f» .UDTPA| |*etseq. 
1. Am JUT 2d, Desk Book, Item No. 124, 
indicating such states as Colorado, Delaware, 
Georgia, Hawa+v Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, and 
Oregon. 
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crond* or s e r v e s : <3) causey likelihood ol c o m m o n or in u » u ^ u a u u » u u ^ 
f o S u o n , cormecdon7 with, or certification by. another; (4) 
uses deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in connec-
tion with goods or services; < * f # ^ 
sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingrediee u, uses, benefits, or quantities 
that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, 
S a d o n , or connection that he does not have: ( 6>^*pn»<^ 
original or new if they are deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, 
original ui * * * 7 t " , Jmx A1_# ^ _ 4 ^ . T i r i ^ i ar* nf a narticular 
used, or i 
standard, 
thev are ox anoiner; \oj uuji««uw *»«*
 6w%.», »*...«.—. -- _• ^ 
by false or misleading representation of fact; (J) advertises goods or services 
3kh intent not to sell them as advertised; (10) advertises goods or services 
with intent not to supply reas6nabiy expectable public demand, unless the 
adverSement disclose? a limitation of quantity; (11) makes false or misleadmg 
statements of fact concerning the reasons for existence of, or amounts ot pnee 
!".!^f"n" nr l\2\ engages in any other conduct whiUl slmlUlly UUCP a 
S e C d I orconfUsionVol J S d e r t B H a g ^ Ihe Act proves ddUUUUni 
of the terms used therein.* 
" °
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S.Tr^il^=^ln a n d need > * * * * < * * « ner 
t(5uipiaer 
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th is used 
:vy 
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and 
and -. 
ey'd 
'"—•*' - _ ^  -*- O U g p J 
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•££id fo: thai 
n 
so 
And
 r e 
Knr 
: A . • 
2 Q Um-hu: ives) 
3 A You. 
I THV, ' *' MII>I. iiM i L,..ii Company did not own that machine' 
i (witness nodding affirmation' 
Q 'Arid thai was ri./n'lv . n c; • i;
 u i • j 10 you. Is that 
correct'"' 
MR, ANDERSON: I'm sorr\ 1 ,1 1 1 , 1 
to interrupt. Whose? 
- MR. ANDERS0! • d I T ..nn.-.i « f , t. 
1
 7.:-r , . -
lo 1 ^ . A N D E R S O N : •". i g h t , T h a n k v o J . 
l a ' ( B y Mr • "< 1 ' m e u u i I | 
15 J » • v - K * ... ,.. ,
 4 .^ ' d tei l en t ha I1 1 1-
• F o u r - -.- - h r 1 b e t w e e n b r e a k d o w n s . >«1: « • * • • If•' f 
1
 • I in, in 
•8 
.ill 
i;\ • Because everything just was v.- , Ou.u uri 
Q Was the cab bolted down tx&i*, 
A No. 
1
, J Secure? 
iv No. 
24 I c. Did i 1 leak ci I "' 
25 A All over. We put two barrels oi it in 1L to run 
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( w i t n e s s noddln . a f f i r m a t i 
Whd \«as ' r * 
R e p a i r i n g i t . 
Te l" r v s^ m* ^; * lie r e p - i - . 
usanc , t w , ; !i 
t » . . 
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A 
r.zcci:,: iff i r a a ; i 
i d .ng e i e c t r r . c i i system? 
Not very w e l l . I t wouldn ' t c.iarge the b a t t e r i e s . 
• . & 
1 Q Were the batteries new? 
2 A No, 
3 Q Did you take the batteries out and replace them 
4 with some old batteries? 
5 A No, I didn't. 
6 MR. TAYLOR: Thii> has already been marked, 
7 I don't know, I want to re-, do I need to re-mark this? It 
8 wasn't accepted. (off record with clerk) 
9 Q (By Mr. Taylor) I want to show you what has been 
10 marked as Defendant's Exhibit 8. I want you to carefully 
11 read those items, and then I'm going to ask you if they 
12 pertain to that particular machine. 
13 A The air cleaner? 
14 Q How about the batteries? 
15 A Two batteries. 
16 _ Q How about the alternator? 
17 A It didn't work. 
18 Q Did it ever work? 
19 A No. 
20 Q How did you start the macMne? 
21 A We had to jump it to start it. 
22 Q If you were to buy a machine of that type, first 
23 of all -- strike that question. The machine had a fresh 
24 dupont-overhaul. Tell me what that \s? 
25 I A Well, it's a new paint job and you buy a used 
-0\- "* 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
future value in it, I'd have kept iv. I've been in the 
business for 23 years. I know when a.mething's been worn 
out. If I could have made another thousand dollars worh of 
it, I would have done it. If I could have made another 
hundred dollars with it, I'd have dore it. But we didn't, 
we elected to do that with it. 
Q Did you ever hear with yout own ears, Roland Olman 
said that he disagrees --
MR. ANDERSON: I'M object to even start-
ing that question, your Honor, if hes, going to ask the wit-
ness if he's heard something someone else has said, that's 
patently hearsay, and I object to it. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MR. TAYLOR: Okay. Thinking about how to 
rephrase the question. 
Q (By Mr. Taylor) Was the cab securely bolted to the 
machine? 
A No, sir, it was not. 
Q Did it have a functional electrical system? 
A No, sir, it did not. 
Q Was the driver's door welded shut? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Was the m^ral in r'^toH in •• ,-d condition? 
A Yes, it was. It was previous .y tipped that machine 
on side and pretty well destroyed the cab on it. 
n-
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1 wouldn't you? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q I'm sorry, I didn't hear that. 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Okay. What does that mean to you, Mr. Garrett, 
6 when you get something that disclaims warranties for failures] 
7 no warranties, sold as is; what does tfcu t mean when you buy 
8 a machine like that? 
9 A That means you are buying it w.he way it is, just 
10 like it says. 
11 MR. ANDERSON: No fv cher questions. 
12 Thank you, Mr. Garrett. 
13 THE COURT: Any further, Mr. Taylor? 
14 MR. TAYLOR: I only have one question. 
15 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
16 BY MR. TAYLOR: 
17 Q And this is, maybe I overlooked it, maybe you've 
18 already answered it; but when you went baei: and looked at 
19 the machine after it had been repainted, ul/.l you indicate 
\0 to me or was it your testimony that there Vui been very littld 
1 alterations or repairs made to the machii^? 
2 Yes. 
i Q Did I ask you the question that if you, isn't it — 
' maybe I'll rephrase that. Isn't it a commct- place, when you 
buy equipment and they represent to you tha: it's in good 
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BY MR. GUY TAYLOR 
Q Okay!going back to check che machine ouf'what 
you see is what it is" does this nean.Mr. Yates,that you 
stand back 20 feet and look at the machine and that is the 
check out? 
A That means you can do anything you want to do with th£t 
machine other than tip it over an-.- wreck it in my yard. 
In my yard there is a place out tc.ore you can go with a 
backhoe and can go dig with and can run it around and check 
it out. I understand that you die that. 
Q .First of all you have to get it to run isn^t that 
truetMr. Yates? 
A Welltif you can't make it run you couldn't 
check it out. 
Q That is true. 
A Anyway I don't think I c:t,d, maybe you could. 
Did you buy this not running? 
Q Unfortunately Jim, I am asking the questions. 
A Okay we will play your ga-ie. 
Q All right if the machine is purchased, I am going 
to rephrase that. 
A Okay. 
Q If a machine is purchased from a person who made 
the representaiton that the macht ie is junk,and you put 
a paint job on it, does that meap that you can, in good 
V&f^ Wef^d'o^i jfci(o*s>Jbflt;t<P 37^ 26 
1 A If a machine, we sell a lot of stuff that is not 
2 J repaired and that, and if we know of anything wrong with it, 
3 we do tell the people what we know is wrong with the machine. 
4 Q (By Mr. Taylor) Do you recall that I asked you 
5 who owned the machine prior to youv obtaining it so that I 
6 could call and talk to the previous owner? 
7 A Which time? 
8 Q At anytime. At any one .ime. 
9 A I've told you it come f^vn Utah Track, right, um-
10 hum. 
11 Q Are you sure that you tcxd me it come from Utah 
12 Track? 
13 A Well, I'm sure I've tol';. you it come from Utah 
14 Track, yes, I'm sure I told you it come from Utah Track. 
15 Q You are sure on that? 1'm going to ask you again, 
16 because I'm going to come back to chat question. Let's be 
17 I honest, Jim. 
A If you would have askeo me, I would have told you, 18 
19 y e s , I mean, 
20 Q Isn't i t true that you :old me that you couldn't 
21 remember the guy ' s name who was the previous owner? 
22 A No, i t i s n o t . Utah Tr >ck. 
23 Q And then the previous c^ner? 
24 A Immediate, uh-huh. That's who I bought it from. 
25 I Q The term "check the mac line out, what you see is 
" *~ 122 
1 Q Would it have been your in1ention to have sold me 
2 a piece of equipment that wasn't worth of money? 
3 Ji Definitely not, no, it wouldn't. It would not 
4 have been my intention to sell you something not worth the 
5 money. No, it would not have been. 
6 MR. TAYLOR: Okay. No further question. 
7 THE COURT: Any naestions. 
8 MR. ANDERSON: M.™ I approach the bench 
9 and get some exhibits, your Honor? 
10 THE COURT: You v.iy. 
11 MR. ANDERSON: I * il be as quick as I can. 
12 FURTHER DIRECT EIiXMINATION 
13 BY MR. ANDERSON: 
14 MR. ANDERSON: 01;>y, we are missing an 
15 exhibit. 
16 MR. TAYLOR: Woul-i it be 9? 
17 MR. ANDERSON: It would be 9, possibly. 
18 Q (By Mr. Anderson) Okay, JJa, just tie this down. 
19 MR. ANDERSON: I 'a going to approach the 
20 witness, your Honor. 
21 Q (By Mr. Anderson) Showing vou Exhibit No. 1. 
22 That's the original document wherein :he machine was sold to 
23 Mr. Taylor. Is that correct? 
24 A Thatfs right, uh-huh. 
25 Q On that document it talks a'jout warranties in two 
17 
18 
1 purpose of the under the Code, 7QA-2-315: Implied warranty, 
2 fitness for the purpose, where the selle.; at the time of con-
3 tracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which 
4 the goods are required and the buyer is relying on the seller 
5 skill and judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, unles^ 
6 excluded or modified under the next secticn. An implied 
7 warranty. 
8 Now, Mr. Yates represented to me that the machine 
9 was in good condition. You heard the testimony, your Honor, 
10 right here. He said it was in good condition, in fact even 
11 went so far on one occasion to say that i~ was in excellent 
12 condition at the time that it was picked up by me to try out. 
13 The matter of the second agreement or the agreement 
14 made in the Century Equipment yard. That ^articular agree-
15 ment had some conditions. Your Honor, Condition 1. was Mr. 
16 J Yates said "hey, if the machine doesn't work out for ygu^, 
bring it back and I'll give you your moneyJback." No. 2. , th£ 
representationwas made thatheowed the b^nk for the machine 
19 and with the machine gone he was out of trist, and based on 
20 that it was reasonable that a check would be tendered so that 
21 he was not sold out of trust. You heard t';at testimony and 
*2 recognize that that, on that basis the che;.'; was issued. 
!3
~ Also, the contract was not renegotiated, it was 
4 merely corrected. The correction made to vne contract, the 
5
 second one, was simply the amount of $22,00° replaced $2,200, 
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The Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act 
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act4 was promulgated in 1970 and 
ed in 1971. It has been adopted by only a few states.9 Among the 
es of the Act are the protection of consumers from suppliers who 
in deceptive and unconscionable sales practices,9 and to make state 
ion of consumer sales practices not inconsbtent with the policies of the 
1 Trade Commission Act relating to consumer protection.7 
ally, the Act prohibits deceptive acts or practices by a supplier in 
tion with a consumer transaction whether they occur before, during, or 
le transaction,9 and sets forth in detail a number of acts or practices 
ire considered to be deceptive.9 
Act prohibits unconscionable acts or practices by a supplier in conneo 
th a consumer transaction.19 The unconscionability of an act or practice 
estion of law for the court, but the parties may be given a reasonable 
unity to present evidence to aid the court in mating its determination.11 
:t specifies in detail the circumstances which the court may consider in 
ining whether an act or practice is unconscionable.11 The Act defines 
its used therein.11 
PA § 2(a). 
dons: Actionable nature of advcrtis-
gning quality or worth of merchandise 
as, 42 ALR4th 318. 
PA§1. 
'A §5 1 et teq. 
Jur 2d, Desk Book, Item No. 124 
t a footnote, indicates that three states 
med the Act. These states are Kansas. 
€. UCSPA } 1(2). 
7. UCSPA S 1(4). 
8. UCSPA § S(a). 
9.UCSPAJS(D)(1)-(11). 
10. UCSPA 14. 
11. UCSPA § 4(b). 
12. UCSPA M(c)(l)-(6). 
- ^ s - -
"H if 
nh4 
liability.7 
{^98. Provision waiving, or immunizing from, bad faith or fraud 
No covenant of immunity can be drawn that will protect a person who acts 
in bad faith, because such a stipulation is against public policy, and the courts 
will not enforce it.* Similarly, the law does not permit a covenant of immunity 
to be drawn that will protect a person against his own fraud; such a covenant 
is unenforceable because of public policy." A party to a contract cannot, hy 
misrepresentation of a material fact, induce the other party to enter inrn th* 
contract to his damage, and then protect himself from the leyal effect of such 
misrepresentation by inserting a clause in the contract to the effect that he is 
not to be held liable for the misrepresentation.^, It is a general rule that 
provisions in a contract—tor example, one for the sale of real **t*to nr 
personal property—the purpose of which is to secure from the vendee or 
buyer, in advance, a waiver of or estoppel against anv claim of fraud on the 
part of the vendor or seller, or his agent or representative, in securing the 
contract, will not be given effect to preclude the former from setting up or jf V n 
relying upon such fraud in order to defeat the contract or avoid liability x 
thereunder.* • 
1111 Observation: Under the Restatement, a term unreasonably exempting <J*-3LS 
a party from the legal consequences of a misrepresentation is unenforcea-
ble on grounds of public policy.* 
§ 299. —Stipulations excluding extraneous representations constituting or 
showing fraud 
One of the parties to a transaction or agreement memorialized by a writing 
may attempt to exclude from consideration, in the event of subsequent 
controversy or litigation, any statements, remarks, or representations which 
may have been made during the negotiations, or any such representations 
which may not be included in the writing itself. Such efforts at exclusion have 
generally been unsuccessful where such statements or representations are 
found to have been made fraudulently or to be of such nature that a charge of 
79. Restatement, Contracts 2d § 195. 
80. Industrial k General Trust v Tod, 180 NY 
215, 73 NE 7; Christian Mills. Inc. v Savoia 
Macaroni Mfg. Co., 228 App Div 717, 239 NYS 
283. 
81. United States v United States Cartridge 
Co. (CA8 Mo) 198 F2d 456. cert den 345 US 
910, 97 L Ed 1345. 73 S Ct 645; Sovereign 
Camp. W. O. W. v Heflin, 188 Ga 234. 3 SE2d 
559; Jordan v Nelson (Iowa) 178 NW 544, 10 
ALR 1464; Bates v Southgate, 308 Mass 170, 
31 NE2d 551. 133 ALR 1349 (disapproving the 
distinction stated in Colonial Development 
Corp. v Bragdon, 219 Mass 170, 106 NE 633, 
between fraud "antecedent" to the contract 
and feud "entering into the making" thereof); 
Ganley Bros, v-Butler Bros. Bldg. Co., 170 
Minn 373, 212 NW 602. 56 ALR 1; Young 
Fehlhabcr Pile Co. v State. 265 App Div 61. 37 
NYS2d 928; Baylies v Vanden Boom. 40 Wyo 
411, 278 P 551, 70 ALR 924. 
82. Ganlev Bros, v Butler Bros. Bldg. Co.. 170 
Minn 373. 212 NW 60? 56 AIR 1- Yminr 
FVhlHah^r Pilg flft. v Staff ?ft* App n i v fil %1 
flY5SrS28 
83. Arnold v National Aniline k Chemical Co. 
(CA2 NY) 20 F2d 364. 56 ALR 4; Barrie v 
Miller, 104 Ga 312, 30 SE 840; B. F. Bonewell 
k Co. v jacobson, 130 Iowa 170, 106 NW 614; 
Ganley Bros, v Butler Bros. Bldg. Co., 170 
Minn 373. 212 NW 602. 56 ALR 1; Land 
Finance Corp. v Sherwin Electric Co., 102 Vt 
73, 146 A 72. 75 ALR 1025; Holcomb k Hoke 
Mfg. Co. v Auto Interurban Co., 140 Wash 
581, 250 P 34. 51 ALR 39; Baylies v Vanden 
Boom. 40 Wyo 411, 278 P 551, 70 AIfl«24. 
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Mf the parties. Any such specification must be 
I in good faith and within limits set by commer-
1 reasonableness. 
.Unless otherwise agreed specifications relating 
aent of the goods are at the buyer's option 
itxcept as otherwise provided in Subsections (l)(c) 
i (3) of Section 70A-2-319 specifications or ar-
ents relating to shipment are at the seller's 
i Where such specification would materially af-
t the other party's performance but is not season-
f made or where one party's cooperation is neces-
r to the agreed performance of the other but is not 
bly forthcoming, the other party in addition 
fill other remedies 
*'<a) is excused for any resulting delay in his 
performance; and 
(b) may also either proceed to perform in any 
I reasonable manner or after the time for a mate-
"rial part of his own performance treat the failure 
to specify or to cooperate as a breach by failure to 
deliver or accept the goods. lses 
against in-
obligation 
Ml) 
>w ^ 
If 
Mfcanti 
1-2-312. Warranty of title and 
fringement — Buyer's 
against infringement 
Subject to Subsection (2) there is in a contract 
• sale a warranty by the seller that 
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its 
transfer rightful; and 
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from an; 
• security interest or other lien or encumbrance 
• which the buyer at the time of contracting has 
knowledge. 
2) A warranty under Subsection (1) will be 
or modified only by specific language 
stances which give the buyer reason to 
it the person selling does not claim title in 
rthat he is purporting to sell only such right or 
I he or a third person may have. 
"(3) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a 
 regularly dealing in goods of the kind warranl 
; the goods shall be delivered free of the rightfi 
L of any third person by way of infringement or 
• like but a buyer who furnishes specifications to 
> seller must hold the seller harmless against any 
fgoch claim which arises out of compliance with the 
[verifications. 1966 
fQA-2-313. Express warranties by affirmation, 
£, promise, description, sample. 
-4,(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as 
Allows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by 
the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods 
^ and becomes part of the basis of the bargain cre-
ates an express warranty that the goods shall 
conform to the affirmation or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made 
. part of the basis of the bargain creates an express 
warranty that the goods shall conform to the de-
scription. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of 
the basis of the bargain creates an express war-
M' ranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to 
Sj the sample or model. ) * 
[ (2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express 
warranty that the seller use formal words such as 
^warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific 
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation 
tterely of the value of the goods or a statement pur-
K 
porting to be merely the seller's opinion or commen-
dation of the goods does not create a warranty. ISM 
70A-2-314. Implied warranty — Merchantabil-
ity — Usage of trade. 
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 
70A-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be mer-
chantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the 
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that 
kind. Under this section the servicing for value of 
food or drink to be consumed either on the premises 
or elsewhere is a sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such 
as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under 
the contract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair 
average quality within the description; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which 
such goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the 
agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity 
within each unit and among all units involved; 
and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and 
labeled as the agreement may require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of 
fact made on the container or label if any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 
70A-2-316) other implied warranties may arise from 
course of dealing or usage of trade. 1966 
70A-2-315. Implied warranty — Fitness for par-
ticular purpose. 
Where the seller at the time of contracting lias rea-
Ison to know any particular purpose Tor which tEe 
[goods are required and that tne buyer is relying on
 t 
the seller's s y j J ^ ^ ^ ^ T t e S M O T j ^ ^ S j H r i 
able goods, there is unless exduded^rjnodified under^ 
ihe next section an*lmpfie?lirarrajity thatl^ie^rads"* 
shall be fit for such purpose. 1965 
70A-2-316. Exclusion or modification of war-
ranties — Livestock. 
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an 
xpress warranty and words or conduct tending to 
• limit warranty shall be construed wherever 
reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject 
to the provisions of this chapter on parol or extrinsic 
evidence (Section 70A-2-202) negation or limitation 
is inoperative to the extent that such construction is 
unreasonable. 
(2) Subject to Subsection (3), to exclude or modify 
the implied warranty of merchantability or any part 
of it the language must mention merchantability and 
in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to ex-
clude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the 
exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Lan-
guage to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is 
sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no 
warranties which extend beyond the description on 
the face hereof." 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2) 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate other-
wise, all implied warranties are excluded by ex-
pressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other 
language which in common understanding calls 
tflfe Duyer's attention to the exclusion of warran-
ties and makes plain that there is no implied 
warranty; and 
(b) when the buyer before entering into the 
contract has examined the goods or the sample or 
model as fully as he desired or has refused to 
^ 
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j IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
2 STATE OF UTAH 
3 JIM YATES, 
4 Plaintiff, ) Civil No. 900 400 61 
5 VS. ) AFFIDAVIT OF DAN WHETSTONE 
6 GUY TAYLOR, 
7 Defendant. 
g STATE OF OREGON 
9 County of Tillamook. 
]0 I, DAN WHETSTONE, being first duly sworn and upon oath, 
jj depose and say as follows: 
1. I am the mechanic who had done repair work on a Case 
980 Excavator, Serial No. 6203826, which was purchased from Mr. 
Jim Yates in Lehi, State of Utah. 
2. I was present when this machine arrived in Tillamook, 
Oregon, and helped unload this machine. 
3. This machine had a large pool of oil under it, it had 
to be jumped started, and would barely move off the trailer. 
4. The machine had been advertised in My Little Salesman, 
June 1990 edition, and was priced for $22,000.00. 
5. Randy Ackerman went to Utah and purchased this machine, 
6. Randy Ackerman works on a commercial fishing boat and 
is at sea. Mr. Ackerman has been unable to use the machine to 
date on his property for the purpose he intended to use the 
machine. 
7. Since the machine arrived in Oregon, I have worked on 
the machine off and on for a total time of two weeks. 
///// 
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8. The batteries were old, and I put new batteries in the 
machine. The windshield was missing. The side door window was 
cracked. The wiring system was out of order except for the 
ignition switch and starter button. I am still working on the 
wiring. The gages did not work. There are many serious 
hydraulic leaks. The track motors had to be rebuilt, and one 
digging break had to be rebuilt. 
9. The machine was not in good condition as advertised in 
the June 1990 edition of rfy Little Salesman. 
10. The total price of $22,000.00 has been paid for the 
machine. This price included delivery to Tillamook, Oregon. 
11. The machine is still not working properly and has 
$3,500+ more that must be invested to get the machine to work 
properly. 
Further this affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this \& day of June, 199*. 
17 || DAN WHETSTONE 
18 || Subscribed and sworn to before me this JO day of June, 
1991. 
19 
20 II ^SSssS3s3Sfe^3sa5S5=:s_ss<^___ Notary P u b l i c f o r Oregon ssss s^ sss,^^^^^^^^^^ Notary P u b l i c f o r Orego ^/ /^ 
r
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JIM YATES 
vs. 
GUY TAYLOR 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER: 900400061 
RULING 
Defendant. 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501, on 
the motion of defendant seeking a ruling on defendants 
objections to Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order. The Court has reviewed the file, and upon being advised 
in the premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. The Court declines to rule apon said matter for the 
reason that no proposed written findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and order have yet been submitted to the Court by counsel for 
the plaintiff as directed at the close ol the trial. Defendant's 
objections and motion are thus premature. 
Dated this 20th day of June, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
CULLE CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
cc: Guy Taylor 
Gary Anderson, Esq. 
Jim Yates 
M-
Guy Taylor, Pro Se 
H.C. 2 Box 40 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
Telephone No. (801) 738-2608 
^ i#$r 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JIM YATES DBA CINCO EQUIPMENT 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
VS 
GUY TAYLOR, 
Defendant/Appallant 
AFFIDAVIT OF GUY TAYLOR 
CASE NO. 900400061 CV 
HONORABLE CULLEN Y. 
CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
or 
Z 
o J 
THE AFFIANT GUY TAYLOR, BEING FIRST SWORN, SAYS: 
1. A TAPE RECORDING, AND AFFIDAVIT OF DAN WHETSTONE, COULD 
ONLY BE OBTAINED, AFTER THE COURT TRIAL, SINCE THE NAME OF 
THE PARTY THE PLAINTIFF SOLD THE EXCAVATOR TO, WAS NOT SUPPLIED 
TO THE DEFENDANT PRIOR TO TRIAL. [DISCOVERY DURNING THE TRIAL 
(A COPY OF A FAX TRANSMISSION FROM THE PLAINTIFF TO COUNSEL) 
J WAS INTRODUCED TO THE DEFENDANT DURNING THE COURT TRIALD. THIS 
FAX TRANSMISSION WAS ALTERED,AND THIS FACT WAS PRESENTED TO 
THE COURT (tr 111) ENCLOSED, DEFENDANTS EXHIBIT 1. 
2. THE AFFIDAVIT STATES THE FOLLOWING [AFTER] RECEIVING THE 
MACHINE AT TILLAMOOK, OREGON. 
<1) THE BATTERIES WERE OLD 
<£) THE WINDSHIELD WAS MISSING 
(3) THE SIDE DOOR WINDOW WAS CRACKED 
(4) THE WIRING SYSTEM WAS OUT OF ORDER 
<5> THE GAGES DO NOT WORK 
(6) THERE ARE MANY HYDROLIC LEAKS 
(7) THE TRACK MOTOR HAD TO BE REBUILT 
(8) ONE DIGGING BRAKE HAD TO BE REBUILT 
(9) THE MACHINE WOULD BARELY MOVE OFF THE TRAILER 
(10) THE MACHINE HAD A LARGE POOL OF OIL UNDER IT. 
<11) THE MACHINE WAS ADVERTIZED IN THE JUNE EDITION OF 
MY LITTLE SALESMAN AS BEING IN GOOD CONDITION. 
(1£) THE MACHINE CWAS NOT] IN GOOD CONDITION AS ADVERTISED 
IN MY LITTLE SALESMAN. 
3. THE DEFENDANT INTRODUCED THE JUNE (6-90) EDITION OF MY LITTLE 
SALESMAN AT TRIAL AND IT WAS ACCEPTED AS DEFENDANTS EXHIBIT 10. 
4. THE DEFENDANT [DISCOVERED] THAT NONE OF THE WORK CLAIMED 
BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS EVER DONE TO SAID EXCAVATOR, AS CLAIMED 
IN PLAINTIFFS TRIAL EXHIBIT 9, WHICH SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED 
THE COSTS AND EXPENSES THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMED WERE MADE AS A 
RESULT OF THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANTS USE OF SAID 
EXCAVATOR. 
5. DEFENDANT HAS AVAILABLE CNEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCED FROM 
THE PURCHASER OF THE HEIN WARNER MACHINE, MENTIOND DURNING 
THE COURT TRIAL, WHERE THRE PLAINTIFF MISREPRESENTED THE 
CONDITION OF THAT MACHINE ALSO. THIS MANS NAME IS GEORGE 
COLLINS, WHO RESIDES IN ROCK SPRINGS WYOMING TELEPHONE 
NUMBER 307 38£ 5463. [DISCOVERY] NOW INDICATES THAT THREE 
PARTIES HAVE BEEN RIPPED OFF, THE DEFENDANT, WHETSTONE/ACKERMAN, 
AND GEORGE COLLINS, ALL HAVE BEEN RIPPED OFF BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
IN ADDITION, THE COURT LIKEWISE MADE A DECISION BASED UPON 
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS NOT TRUE. (pLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 9). 
6. DEFENDANT FEELS THE COURT SHOULD, IN THE INTERST OF JUSTICE, 
RELEIVE THE DEFENDANT FROM THIS JUDGEMENT WHICH WAS OBTAINED 
THROUGH FRAUD. 
DATED THIS 30TH DAY OF JULY 1992. ^ / O 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME 
JULY 1992. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I CERTIFY I MAILED A COPY OF THE FOREGOING TO THE FOLLOWING 
POSTAGE PREPAID AT DUCHESNE UTAH, THIS 31ST DAY OF JULY 
199£. 
MR GARY ANDERSON, ESQ 
ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
750 NORTH £00 WEST, SUITE 102 
PROVO, UTAH 84601 
THIS 31ST DAY OF 
the backside there, in case you are wondering what that is, 
that's where your man was told not to sign it. Wrote that up 
the day he brought that in. That gives his name and every-
thing at the bottom. 
THE COURT: Now just a moment, wait until 
he asks you a question, Mr. Yates. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you, sir. 
Q (By Mr. Taylor) What date was this? I was looking 
for it. Usually, a Fax machine will leave a date that a 
transaction is faxed to a»party. And I note that's been 
cut off of this. Was that for some reason? 
A It certainly wasn't. 
Q I mean, after all, that is a faxed copy. I have 
no record of receiving a copy. Doesn't that seem kind of 
strange to you? 
A No, it don't. 
Q Regarding this information that I requested that 
you supply me with and you agreed to in your deposition. 
Isn't it true I requested this information? 
THE COURT: Mr. Tavlor. where are you 
going with this line of Questioning? 
MR. TAYLOR: I think Mr. Yates is purpose 
ly holding back information to defraud me. to cost me money, 
i going from. 
THE COURT: You think'he sold the prop-
And that's where I'm 
111 
